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Abstract 
The sociology of law has a long-smndi~ tradition and indeed proO__,co4__ a vast li~-ratun~ in the area of litigation. 
Meanwhile, a complememary perspective has been prmemnd which we discuss with the following f~mr perspec- 
fiver: the relatio,,~ip between legal ecommim and legal sociologisU; the project of Van Loon, Drink, and 
Van Wamboke; an overview of law and economics research with respect to the legal process; and the question 
of whether both ~p~ches are complementary. 
Litigation, legal process, economic v.sociological mlyu~ empirical re~ar~ 
1. The Relationship Between Legal Economists and Legal Sociologists 
It is noteworthy that the sociology of law has a gnealer variety of methodologies than has 
law and economics. With respect o its object of study, legal sociology also recognizes 
a wider range. For a long time it looked as if the role that legal sociology could have for 
legal poUcy making would be comparable tothe role economic science could have for eco- 
nomic policy making. The question arises as to whether economics and sociology are dif- 
ferent disciplines that provide complementary insights or whether one is a branch of the 
other. In our view both have their own autonomous spheres. Sometimes they provide com- 
plementary information regarding the law. Sometimes they pose different questions. The 
~_,~! value of sociology of law is not in discussion. The sociology of law pn~des insights 
where law and economics cannot. We will, however, vigorously object o claims that law 
and economics i not an independent way to obtain knowledge of legal phenomena. Hence, 
it is our firm belief that law and economics can provide insights where the sociology of the 
law in its turn c~nnot. These concern analyses that concentrate on efficiency and costs. 
However, the relationship between law and economics and the sociology of law is not 
confined to a scientific discourse. In this respect we mention the often-heard but unjusti- 
fied admiration for economics as an exact science. Surely, this is more of a psychological 
matter or a topic for sociology of science. For economists it is a matter of sound, healthy 
competition. 
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2. Comments on the Project of Van Loon, Delrue, and Van Wambeke 
The goal of the research project of Van Loon, Delrue, and Van Wambeke is to assess the 
significance of some perspectives of sociological research on litigation. Such a task is dif- 
ficuh to accomplish. Science seldom leads to definite and clear answers to practical ques- 
tions. We probably all agree that he research subject of the social sciences, among which 
we explicidy count he science of economics, is complex and not easily reduced to simple 
theories or mechanisms. Unfortunately, difficult questions don't get answered by pointing 
out how difficult our scientific task is. One has to ~ a method to deal with these social 
phenomena. Here our methods differ. Sociologists stress again and again the need to take 
into account he overwhelming diversity of social phenomena. In this respect the conclusion 
of the authors that not many grand sociological theories are used in litigation studies is 
not a surprise. Economists generally choose to work with simplyfing assumptions and pro- 
c_~_ according the method of the so-called orderly loss of information. 
Perhaps one can justifiedly criticize the law and economics movement for not having 
a long-standing tradition in empirical research. However, we would forcefully argue that 
it does provide a uniform framework not only for studying litigation topics but all areas 
of law. In this respect it does offer a grand theory, but one that recognizes its limits. 
Van Loon, Delrue, and Van Wambeke distinguish two perspectives of ana|ySis in the 
sociology of law, and their approach to sociology of law is bound to cause problems for 
legal economists. They refer to the scholar Van Houtte when they stress that "the character- 
istic frame of reference of sociology of law requires that all research should be based on 
some social problem or issue. This is a state of affairs in human relations that a certain 
group feels to be wrong and about which the need is felt to do something7 Where Van Loon 
and colleagues put to us that the sociology of law needs the confrontation with a concrete 
question from social reality, we counterargue that for the economist the real world is often 
a special case! This is not to say that the issues are anything else than real problems. Eco- 
nomics, however, proceeds by developing mode/.v of social phenomena. By a model we 
mean a simplified representation f reality. The emphasis here is on the word s/mp/e. We 
do not look for an economic model (or any approach for that matter) that attempts o describe 
every aspect of reality. A model's power stems from the elimination of irrelevant detail, 
which allows the economist to focus on the essential features of the reality he or she is 
attempting to understand (Varian, 1993, pp. 1-2). 
Quite another matter is the sociologists' inclination to take sides with the supressed or 
have-nots. It may appear that economists have fewer problems in analyzing situations from 
a given distn'bgtion fwealth and rights. Law and economics operates within the framework 
of critical ration~l[~n a d has as its ideal to eliminate value judgments as much as possible. 
Koen Raes (1990, blz. 385) is right in argq,lng that in positive law and economics value 
options cannot be avoided. Law and economics i  value loaded. Objectivity as an ideal 
can only be achieved ff the formal and material consistency of theories can be fully proven. 
However, hypotheses cannot be tested separately. Hence law and economics will have some 
subjective bias. It contains ideas--a]so paradigms (Kuhn) or hard core (Lakatos)--that re 
postulated and maintained for a long time without being falsified. 
The study that Van Loon and Wouters have conducted into the quantitative r lation.ship 
between the different stages of a conflict is interesting. It could be compared to the recent 
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study of the Dutch National Bureau of Statistics. This latter shows how sensitive these out- 
comes are in relation to the type of conflict studied. The authors tate that "Ultimately, 
only 11 percent of all conflicts were brought before the court. Little under half were settled 
informally; the remaining were given up at one stage or another ?' First, to us this seems 
a rather high percentage. A research project of the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, 
aimed at different forms of legal protection for the financial consequences of illness and 
injury, found that less than one-haft percent ever went as far as court (Harris, 1984). One 
course one should keep in mind that different types of cases will lead to differently formed 
pyramids (from baseline, the grievances, to top, the court filing), whereby (post)divorce 
cases end up in court much more frequently than tort or discriwin~tlou cases (MiLler and 
Sarat, 1980-1981, pp. 525-566). Furthermore, l gal economists are interested inthe incen- 
fives parties have to opt for alternative ways of dispute resolution. Government provided 
courts represent only one method of resolving disputes. If they become too costly, disputants 
will film to Other forms: ~'mall claims trl'lxmals, arbitration, out-of-court settlements, penalty 
clauses, and performance bonds. The court is in competition with these other techniques 
of dispute resolution, and the business will flow to the one that offers the best service at 
the lowest price. If alternative methods of dispute resolution are cheaper or faster, then 
not only will government-provided courts lose business, but government policy will focus 
on those less costly alternatives. 
3. Law and Economics Research 
Law and economics deals with economic explanations of the law and predictions of the 
consequences of legal rules. In order to explain these rules and their consequences the 
tools of microeconomic theory are used. The reason in that he rules created by law estab- 
lish implicit prices for different kinds of behavior, and the consequences of those rules 
are analyzed as the response to those implicit prices (Cooter and Ulen, 1988, p. 11). It 
could be suggested broadly that the more important fields of law and economics research 
of litigation include a decision whether to settle or to go to trial, expenditures onlitigation, 
and access to legal remedies (cost rules; contingent fees) (Ogus and Veljanovski, 1984, 
pp. 324-352). The field of litigation thus is a good example of an area of law where both 
disciplines are active. 
Economists have analyzed civil procedure in the context of their perspective of law as 
a set of behavioral rules. This is partly captured by Posner's cost-effectiveness goal of mini- 
mizing the sum of direct and error costs. A more general model would also examine the 
impact of procedural rules on the incentives to avoid litigious matters. Two models can 
be distinguished (Scott, 1975, pp. 937 IT). The first is the conflict resolution model that 
sees civil process primarily as a method of achieving peaceful settlement ofprivate disputes. 
This model, which underlies the way most lawyers view the courts, stresses such factors 
as the degree of harm, compensation, fairness, and winimiT.ing the abuse of procedure 
by such practices as vexatious litigation, champerty, and maintenance. In contrast the be- 
harbor modification theory sees the courts' rulings as a way of altering behavior by impos- 
ing costs on a person. It focuses primarily on the behavior of defendants rather than the 
rights of plaintiffs, on whether the former, confront the appropriate set of costs and incen- 
tives, and the efficiency, consistency, and predictability of legal procedures. 
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Error costs can take many forms. Statisticians frequently distinguish type I errors (failing 
to convict or penalize the guilty) from type II errors (convicting or pe~li~ng the innocent). 
The sionificance of these errors will depend on the severity of the penalty. In a criminal 
case, where the accused cannot insure agtirLtt the penalty and may be liable to imprison- 
merit, a type II error will have serious consequences and is more likely to be avoided. This 
may explain why the staiida.rd of proof is higher in criminal cases than in civil cases, t 
The majority of civil cases are settled out of court because it is cheaper. The economic 
model--first developed by Landes (1971) and discussed by Posner (see Gould, 1973; Fried- 
mann, 1969)---suggests that litigation occurs because one or both parties are overly opti- 
mistic about heir chances of winning. Litigation may also arise because the parties cannot 
agree on the sum that will settle the dispute (Cooter and Marks, 1982). In the economic 
analysis of litigation in this area the rationality assumption underlying economics can often 
found m be complemented with psychogical insights. Simon's bounded rationality stems 
from this element. In a Dutch study into lawyers' predictions of judicial decisions it was 
empirically shown that when predicting the outcome of their cases, lawyers first were sen- 
sitive to the factors that determine judicial decisions. This appeared from the fact that the 
success rate increased gradually along with their assessed probabilities. Second, however, 
a significant tendency toward overconfidence was found: lawyers generally estimated a too 
high probability of attaining their goals. This overconfidence was not extremely large, com- 
pared to overconfidence found for for example physicians (Malsch, 1989; Christensen- 
Salanszy and Bushyhead, 1981). If litigants behave as rational utility maximizers, then alter- 
native methods of allocating legal costs will have predictable influence on their willing, hess 
to go to court (Shavell, 1982). 
Some economists have questioned the social efficiency of the adversarial system. Thus 
Tullock (1980, ch. 6, 1978, 1971) has argued that it leads to excessive xpenditure on 
litigation and that judges are undermotivated to seek out efficient solutions. It may also 
be socially inefficient to rely on the private financing of litigation. Precedents have public 
good qualities. A binding precedent ot only decides the case but also influences the behavior 
and welfare of all potential litigants. Such legal rules may be underproduced since individual 
litigants will not take into account he total benefits. 
The model has also been applied to investigate the impact of litigation on the develop- 
ment of precedent. Some (see Rubin, 1977; and Priest, 1977) have argued that the very 
existence of litigation encourages an evolution toward efficiency, since there is an incentive 
on the parties to .fettle claim.~ based on efficient rules, but to challenge, and thus eventually 
to secure the correction of,/ne~c/ent rules. More recent work has indicated that this is 
only one of the many pess~le outcomes. The type of cuses and their effects on substantive 
legal rules depend crucially on the assumptions regarding the behavior of the litigants and 
the judiciary (Carringtou, 1979). The parties may be content with inefficient rules or be 
motivated to challenge fficient rules on distributional grounds (Kornlmnser, 1980). 
4. Are Both Disciplinary Approaches Complementary? 
It is noteworthy that the subject of litigation has been extensively researched into by the 
two disciplines. Litigation proves to be a fruitful field for both. In 1988 both the economists 
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Van Tulder and Janssen (1988) and the sociologist Klijn (1988) focused in their respective 
policy reviews on the price elasticity of the demand for legal services. Both were inspired 
by changes in Dutch law that make subsidized legal services more expensive. Both studies 
concluded that within the context of the present system the sensitivity of the demand for 
legal services is low. 
In a comment on these two studies Griffiths wrote the following: "On the whole one can 
say that microeconomic analysis, insofar it has been applied to problems of choice, has 
not proven really revealing: neither the relevant variables nor their essential relationships 
to each other are different, for example in Klijn's more traditional sociological approach 
than in Van Tulder's and Janssen's approach. At most the microeconomic approach is a 
useful technique for data analysis, with a beguiling 'cleanness' which tends to make one 
overlook how many variables of well-established hnportance ( .g. culture and social struc- 
ture) are being ignored, how many (often dubious) assumptions are being made, how weak 
the empirical base of the operation really is, etc. Still the proof of the pudding is in the 
eating. It will be interesting tosee whether Van Tulder and/anssens' model is capable of 
accurately predicting future changes in the use and distn'bution flegal services" (Gl-ifSths, 
1989, p. 357). More recent studies have not falsified Janssen and Van Tulder's findings. 
However, in more recent work these authors have refined their analysis considerably. Thus 
they have split up the market for legal aid in partial markets to assess more accurately 
the effect of higher contributions has on different income groups (Van Tulder and Janssen, 
1987-1989). Griffiths is right in underlining that microeconomic and welfare analysis can 
be seen as a set of tools. In our view, however, it is exactly this tool box that can be used 
eclecticly to deal with a wide variety of problems. With respect to the realism of assump- 
tions we would answer it is not their reality but their usefulness we are concerned with. 
Some economL~s will argue that he realism of assumptions is totally irrelevant. Friedmann 
thus talks about "as if" explanations. If we observe an effect as a consequence of an individ- 
ual's behavior, which should show if these individuals would beha~re inthe way we assumed 
them to, then we are allowed to use these assumptions, even if they turn out to be incorrect. 
Therefore, it is not the behavior that is conform our assumptions, but the consequences 
of this behavior are presumed to correspond as ifthe individuals behave according to our 
assumptions. 
In correspondence with our economic logic, recent research showed that he price elasticity 
for legal advice is higher than that for legal aid proper (aid in court proceedings) (Klijn, 
1995). 2The fact that raising the amount litigants have to pay themselves results in a con- 
siderable reduction of legal advice work is in no way inconsistent with earlier findings. 
Price elasticity concerns changes at the margin. Hence one cannot extend such a finding 
to a situation where the changes in price are substantial. 
It seems as if, on the whole, sociologists of law are not overenthusiatic about heir new 
neighbor the economist. Some go even further: we observe that hard-core conomic ques- 
tions, such as the productivity of the courts and their optimal size, are considered to be 
nonscientific by some sociologists (Ietswaart, 1995). We do not find it very fruitful to draw 
a line between pure and applied science. Of course, on the whole a large number of econo- 
mists are applying their trade. This does not make the purely scientific work less relevant 
in any way. One should keep in mind that the courts' capacity to handle cases certainly 
influences the access to justice. Furthermore, by taking into account that capacity in the 
process of law making, the legislator influences litigant options. 
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Notes 
1. On error costs see Po~er (1973), and Tullock (1980). See further for over- and underinclusion Ehrlich and 
Poser (1974). 
2. Report with first findings on the comequences of the revisod I~1 Aid Act with respect o the demand for 
fmanc~ legal aid. 
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